GE"NERXL P1RINCIPLES OF TIM COMMON LAW.

principles of the common law, in contending for their retention
in this country, and are deemed appropriate in this connection.
31. " Common law," says the learned pamphleteer, "is but
another name for common sense, tested and systematically arranged by long experience. What governs the manners of men
towards each other ? It is the common law of social intercourse.
What constitutes the habits and customs of a country, but a
common law, gradually growing with civilization, and always
accommodating itself to the situation of the people ? Nor is the
common law of jurisprudence less pliable. It is one of its excellencies that it is capable of change, of modification, of adapting
itself to new situations and varying times, without losing its
original character, its vital principles, its most useful institutions:" 5 Law Tracts 21, 22. And, again by the common
law "every crime is now defined with mathematical certainty;
and all its various modifications, shapes and circumstances,
defences and palliations, distinctly provided for, either by general
rules and principles, or by particular decisions. So of the modes
of trial, the competency, credibility, and examination of witnesses.
Everything is so constructed as to shield innocence from corrupt
persecution, and to bring the guilty to punishment; at least as
far as human means can effect it :" Ibid. 58.
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Court of Apeals of Kentucky
1.
KEVILL v. KEVILL.
Gross inequality, apparently unjust or unreasonable, is not alone sufficient to
invalidate a will.
But it is entitled to weight as evidence of testamentary incapacity or undue
influence.
These principles applied to the facts of the case.
APPEAL

from the Caldwell Circuit Court.

Thomas Kevill, of Caldwell county, Ky., in June 1855, when
he was seventy-one years old, published, as his will, a testamentary document whereby he disposed of his whole estate, worth
$50,000, unequally among his children by two wives, giving to
those of his first wife comparatively but little, and the residue to
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those of his then.living wife, to whom he devised the most of it
during her life. After probate in the County Court, the document was re-contested in the Circuit Court for the alleged incapacity of the testator and imputed control of his wife. The jury
found a verdict against it, and the court thereupon adjudged that
it was not his will, and overruled a motion for a new trial. From
that judgment both parties appealed, the unsuccessful party
because, as alleged, the verdict was not authorized by the evidence, and the successful party, because the court refused a new
trial on the discovery of additional evidence against the will.
John L. Scott, in support of the will.
Harlan, Attorney-General, contrA.
The opinion of the court was delivered, October 9th 1866, by
ROBERTSON, 3.-Admitting that, anomalous as the procedure
in this case certainly is, the party succeeding on the issue might
be entitled- to a new trial for the purpose of making the case
stronger in the Appellate Court, nevertheless the discovered
testimony in this case, being only slightly cumulative, was of
such a character as not to. have sustained a verdict which, without it, should be set aside as unauthorized by the evidence heard
by the jury; wherefore we cannot grant a new trial to the appellants, who obtained the judgment in the Circuit Court.
But, in our opinion, the Circuit Court erred in refusing a new
trial to the other party.
Gross inequality, apparently unjust or unreasonable, is not
alone sufficient to invalidate a will which otherwise would be unassailable. The testamentary power is of great value in both its
enjoyment and its results, and therefore it should be well guarded
by the law and sternly upheld by the judiciary. Every competent and self-poised mind has, and should always have, an unquestionable right to make its own will according to the law of the
land, and no person, either wife or child, has any legal right to
deny that conservative power or gainsay the free and voluntary
exercise of it. But apparent inequality or unreasonableness in a
testamentary disposition is entitled, in proportion to its degree of
flagrancy, to some auxiliary influen6e on the question of capacity
or fraud or controlling influence, and, unexplained and combined
with other corroborating evidence, it may be entitled to great
influence.
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This is the uniform and undeviating doctrine of this court, and
it was never, in any instance when rightly understood, adjudged
otherwise.
The apparent inequality in Kevill's will may in some degree
be reconciled with parental justice and impartiality by the fact
that when the testator married his last wife he was comparatively
poor; considerably increasing his estate as he did by the accession of her property, he may have thought it his duty to give to her
children the value of her original property and its increase. But,
however this prudential consideration might have operated, the
apparent inequality on the face of the will is not sufficiently forti.
fled by other evidence of incapacity or sinister influence to invalidate it as the testator's last testament.
Few wills have ever been sustained by more consistent and
satisfactory evidence of testamentary capacity. The writer of
the will testified that the testator dictated and fully explained
every provision and was clearly of sound and disposing mind.
Three other subscribing witnesses testified to his capacity with
equal confidence. And all these witnesses had been long and
intimately acquainted with the testator. Several other like
-acquaintances fully and confidently concurred in favor of his
capacity, which is also corroborated by proof of his provident
and successful attention to his business even after the publication
of his will, and nearly or quite to his death, seven years afterwards. This mass of opinions and facts, made almost conclusive
by the internal proof arising from the testator's calm and intelligent dictation of a will so minute and elaborate, is scarcely
affected, in any rational degree, by any opposing opinions or facts
concerning capacity. Indeed, when carefully analyzed, the
opposing testimony does not essentially impair the overwhelming
evidence of capacity at the date of the will, but may be consistent
with it.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the will is unimpeachable
for want of disposing mind.
On the question of the wife's imputed influence, there is some
doubt, but not enough to sustain the judgment against the will.
The effect of all the testimony on this point is only that the wife
had certainly some and probably great influence over the testator's mind in concerns of trivial importance. But it fails to show
any instance of the successful or sinister exercise of it in any
VoL. XV. -
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important matters. On the contrary, all the testimony exhibits
him as a man of sound judgment and strong self-will in all important concerns. Now, although it may be true that stepmothers
often feel jealous of their husband's children by other wives, and
sometimes successfully plot dissension and alienation, and even
though there may be some ground for suspecting that this case
may afford some illustration of that fact, yet there is certainly no
proof of it, or of the exercise of any subjugating influence in the
moulding of the will of Thomas Kevill.
Wherefore the judgment setting aside the will is reversed, and
the will is established by the judgment of this court, and the
cause remanded to the Circuit Court, with instructions to set
aside the verdict and judgment in that court and certify this
judgment to the County Court.
The fact that the foregoing case seems
to assume grounds, in some respect,
different from those maintained. in the
majority of cases involving similar questions, will not render it of less interest
to the profession. A somewhat extensive and careful study of cases bearing upon analogous questions, and large
experience in the trial of similar cases,
has convinced us that it is not practicable
to lay down any general rule in regard
to them which will not require frequent
and marked modification in its practical
application.
The learned judge places great reliance upon two facts as tending to shoV
that there was no satisfactory proof of
undue influence in the case: 1. That the
testator, although more than seventy
years old, was possessed of abundant
capacity to execute a will of the character in question, understandingly, when
left to his own free will and voluntary
action. 2. That although his wife had
confessedly very controlling influence
upon his mind, in matters of. trivial
concern, the evidence failed to show any
instance of such influence of a sinister
character " in any ihnportant matters."
It is also stated, as the result of the evidence, that in all inportant matters the

testator was a man of sound judgment
and strong self-will. Considerable reliance is also placed upon the fact that
the testator dictated the will in such a
manner as to show evident capacity and
the most unquestionable freedom of
action. It is confessedly true that these
considerations have an important bearing upon the question of undue influence
in the factum of a will.
But there are two species of influence
in the production of a will which may
properly be regarded as undue. One
where the testator is a mere passive instrument in the hands of those who produce the will; the other where he lacks
that active control in the affairs of his
household which enables him with
reasonable firmness to resist the importunities and especially the dictation and
offensive annoyances of those about him
who desire to control the disposition of
his estate, and where he is consequently
driven by the dread of such silent but
intolerable grievances to make such a
will as he understands will alone give
hin quiet and peace.
In regard to the former species of influence, this case is certainly free from
all question, and .it would rather seem
that most of the argument of the court
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is directel towards rebutting any inference of that species of influence. But
in regard to the other kind of influence,
it does not appear to us the case is
equally free from all doubt.
The testator was aged, and unquestionably, to some extent, infirm both in
body and mind; he was living with a
second wife who clearly had very marked
influence over him; he made a will giving most of his property to the children
of the second marriage, tor the virtual
disinheritance of those of the first marriage.
Here, then, was a clear case of an
unequal and, on general principles of
natural justice, an unjust distribution
of property among those equally entitled
to the testator's bounty. The will, then,
was of that character which if produced
by any extraneous influence, such influence would be regarded as undue influence. For it is not the extent, but
the character of the influence, which the
law regards as unlawful. A wife or a
child has the legitimate right to influence
the husband or parent to the extent of
doing justice. And although it should
be shown that without such influence the
*will would not have been made or would
have been differently made, it will nevertheless be valid if it be not in any marked
degree unequal and unjust. But the
same degree of influence, when exerted
to produce a vicious result-an unequal
or unjust distribution of the estate among
those equally entitled-would be held
unlawful, or what the law denominates
CCundue influence."
We have examined the authorities and
the principles involved in this and kindred
inquiries in the first part of our work
on Wills, § 38, pp. 507-538, where it
is shovn that undue influence partakes
partly of the nature of fraud ; and if the
person in favor of whose influence the
will is made, either for his own benefit
or that of others, is conscious, as a person of common experience and wisdom

must be presumed to have been conscions, that an unjust result was being
obtained in having the will made as it
was, and such result is secured l- personal solicitation or influenceof any kind,.
although not by words or by any distinctive and definable acts, still if such result
is attained through the agency of other
minds than that of the testator, the will
cannot be maintained. This is well
illustrated by Gilbreath v. Gilbreath, 4
Jones's Eq. 142 ; Dean v. Negley, 41
Penn. St. 312 ; Floyd v. Floyd, 3 Strobh.
44 ; Toodward v. Jones, Id. 552 ; Means
v. M1eans, 5 Id. 167. The cases bearing
upon this point are too numerous to be
here referred to. They are cited very
much in detail in the treatise above referred to.
The precise degree of proof required
to establish undue influence it is not easy
to define. It is generally held that a
will proved to have been understandingly executed, although in favor of a
stranger, to the exclusion of near relatives, is prinudfacievalid, and that those
who oppose the will must show distinct
grounds upon which it should be set
aside: .Sechrest v. E dwards, 4 Mlet.
(Ky.) R. 163. But in a later case in
this same state (Harrel v. Harrel, 1 fDuvail 203) it is said: Gross inequality in
the dispositions of the instrument, where
no, reason for it is suggested either in
the will or otherwise, may change the
burden and require explanation on the
part of those who support the will to
induce the belief that it was the free
and deliberate offspring of a rational,
self-poised, and clearly-disposing mind.
But it must appear, either by direct
proof or reasonable presumption, tiat
the will is not truly that of the testator,
freely and understandingly made. The
character of the will, as applied to the
testator's character and surroundings,
may show this as fully as more direct
and express testimony. But, in general, no doubt, there should be proof of
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distinct effort (and tinder such circumstances as to raise the presumption that
it became successful) to produce a different will from what the testator would
otherwise have made, in order to invalidate the instrument.
But in cases where the testator is confessedly under the control and influence
of the principal legatee, and especially
if the testator were laboring under infirmity or disability, as if his mind were
enfeebled, or he were deficient in one or
more of the important senses, or if he
were deaf and dumb, or blind, or unable
to read writing from defect of education,
the courts have very justly exercised
great circumspection to have it appear
by satisfactory proof that the instrument
was understandingly made. And in
many cases it has been determined by
courts of authority that in this class of
cases if the will is unequal, and especially if it is unnatural, by the disinheritance of the children of the-testator,

it cannot be maintained unless the proof
removes all reasonable doubt or suspicion in regard to it having been freely
and understandingly made by the testator.
By this we do not of course understand
that the c6urts making such declarations
of the rule of evidence intend to require
exactly the same measure of proof in
such cases as in criminal cases. But
where the facts surrounding any claim
tend to excite just suspicion that there
is something factitious in its character,
that implication should be entirely removed. And so long as any claim is
presented in a questionable guise, to any
extent, it ought not to receive the indorsement of the courts until that characteristic is satisfactorily explained and
removed. These views are abundantly
and ably maintained by the opinion of
the court in Watterson ". Watterson, I
Head. 1.
I.E.
F.
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JOHN R. BURROWS v. NEHEMIAH M. GALLUP AND ANOTHER.
Where the owner of land has been dispossessed, a mere casual or stealthy entry
by him does not disturb the adverse possession of the disseisor. His entry must be
intended as an act of possession.
" Where therefore the court charged the jury that a party who claimed a prescriptive right to a public landing must have excluded the public and every member of
it, it was held that the charge was open to exception, as implying an actual exclusion of every member of the public from the premises, while it should have required
only an exclusion from the possession.
Where a highway is laid out to navigable water and there terminates, the
terminus may be regarded as presumably intended for a public landing as incident
to the highway.
Where, however, a highway, running frorii place to place, is laid out along the
shore of a navigable stream and in immediate contact with it for a considerable.
distance, the- reason for the presumption does not exist.
The question in such a case depends on the circumstances, and is one of fact for

the jury.

BURROWS v. GALLUP.
It seems that the statute (Rev. Stat., tit. 38, § 3), which provides that no person
shall acquire title by adverse possession to land belonging to a highway, does not

apply to a public landing not part of a highway.
TRESPASS for entering upon a wharf on Mystic River, claimed
by the plaintiff as his private property; tried to the jury in the
Superior Court, before BUTLER, J., on the general issue, -witl
notice that proof would be offered that the locus was a public
highway and landing.
On the trial it appeared that the wharf was erected by Enoch
Burrows, the grandfather of the plaintiff, adjoining the travelled
path of an ancient highway, and between that and Mystic River,
opposite the family homestead. The acts charged, which consisted of the unlading and deposit of sea-weed upon the wharf,
were admitted, and the defence was that the wharf was built by
Burrows on a public landing-place, recognising the rights of the
public, for more convenient use by the public and himself; he
then having a store and doing a mercantile business in the immediate vicinity. The plaintiff proved a continued use of the
wharf by Burrows and his descendants, to the time of the supposed trespass. The defendants claimed to have proved that it
was originally a landing-place, that Enoch Burrows admitted it
to be such, expressly when he built the wharf, and said that he
built it for the accommodation of the public as well as himself,
nd afterward impliedly in a written communication to the town,
and that it had always been used as such by the public when they
had occasion to use it, and, among other purposes, for the purpose
for which the defendants used it. The plaintiff denied that it was
or ever had been a public landing-place, and claimed to have
proved that the landing-place was below; that he had title to the
land where the wharf was built; and if not, and if originally a
landing-place, that it was an easement distinct from the highway,
and not embraced by the statute of 1809 ; and that he and those
under whom he claimed had, by an exclusive possession, gained a
title as against the public, notwithstanding that statute. Both
parties requested the court to charge in conformity with their
respective claims. The charge of the court was pro forma on
all the points, and as follows on the point of title by adverse
possession.:-" The plaintiff claims that if a public landing-place
originally, yet if, since the wharf was built, he, and those under
whom he claims, have been in the exclusive possession, they. have
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destroyed the public right by fifteen years adverse user. If
there was a landing-place, and it was an easement distinct from
the highway, it was not within the statute, and if they occupied
exclusively for fifteen years they extinguished the public right.
The plaintiff claims that be and his grantors have thus occupied,
and that the user, so far as there has been any by the public, has
been permissive ; that permission was generally asked, and if not
the public understood that the plaintiff and his grantors permitted
the public to use it. The defendants claim that it was not permissive; that Enoch Burrows, when he built it, said that he did
not intend to exclude the public, and that such was the import of
his admission in the communication to the town. You will look
at the writing in connection with the evidence, and say whether
it related to this place. And you will look at all the evidence
and say whether there has been an exclusion of the public, and
whether the public use has been all permissive. In order to
destroy the public right they must have excluded the public and
every member of it. The defendants claim that a large number
of persons have continued to use it, claiming it as a matter of
right, and that there has been no fencing or actual exclusion, and
that the plaintiff and his grantor never took possession intending
to exclude the public. Have the public been substantially excluded
from the place ? If so, the public have lost their rights; if not,
they could not lose them."
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff moved for a new trial for error in the charge.
Hovey and Wait, with whom was A. P. Park,in support of
the motion.
1. The public have no right, either at common law or by statute,
to use the soil of an individual adjoining navigable water as a
landing-place: Ball v. Herbert, 3 T. R. 253 7 Blundell v.
Catterall, 5 Barn. & Ald. 268 ; Pearsallv. Past, 20 Wend. 111;
Post v. Pearsall,22 Id. 425; Angell on Tide Waters 178, 185,
189. Nor can they acquire such right by dedication, for dedication is predicable only of highways, streets, and other easements
in the nature of highways: Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425.
Nor by prescription, because prescription is a personal right, and
the public cannot prescribe for an easement: 3 Cruise Dig. 424;
2 Greenl. Ev., §§ 248, 540; 2 Bla. Com. 263, 264. Nor can
the public in any way acquire the right, except tbrough the action
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of the legislature. Custom may give to the inhabitants of a
particular town or village this right; but custom cannot be
pleaded in favor of the whole community: 2 Greenl. Ev., § 248.
And individuals may acquire the right by prescription.
2. If the locus in quo ever was a landing-place which the
public had the right to use as claimed by the defendants, the
provisions of the statute for preventing persons from acquiring
title to public highways by adverse enjoyment do not apply to it:
Rev. Stat., tit. 38, § 3.
3. To destroy such right of landing the occupation of Burrows
need be such only as to substantially exclude the public from
enjoying the same as a matter of right. To make the rule so
sweeping as to require the exclusion of every human being, would
prevent the acquisition of a title to places which had been used
as public landings, as effectually as if there existed a statute
applicable to landing-places similar to the Act of 1809 relating
to highways, and the Act of 1846 relating to railroads and
canals.
4. Even if any individual did land there claiming that he had
the right so to do as one of the public, the exercise of such
claimed right would not prevent Burrows holding the premises by
adverse possession against the. public, but only as against the
individual who so landed. Therefore if Gallup landed the sea
weed on the locus in quo under a claim of right, it was U personal
right merely and not a public one.
Liypitt and Halsey, contra.
1. A mere use of the locus in quo conferred no exclusive right
so to use it. It was but the exercise of a common right. To
acquire an exclusive right to that which before was public and
common, it must be exercised to the exclusion of all others. A
mixed use is not sufficient: 1 Swift Dig. 161; Washburn on
Easements 412, 413; Nichols v. (ates, 1 Conn. 318; C/alker
v. Dickinson, Id. '882; -Delawareand Maryland Railroad Co.
v. Stump, 8 Gill. & J. 479 ; Collins v. Ben bury, 5 Ired. 118;
Rogers v. Allen, 1 Camp. 309.
2. The party who claims the exercise of any right inconsistent
with the free enjoyment of a public easement or pivilcge, must
put himself on the ground of prescription, unless he has a grant
from the government: 2 Hilliard on Real Prope-ty, chmp. 60,
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§ 11; Arundcl v. McCulloch, 10 Mass. 70; Carter v. 1ifurcot,
4 Burr. 2164. And it is one of the essential elements of a
prescriptive right that it should have been enjoyed to the exclusion
of all against whom it is claimed: Washburn on Easements 96;.
Kilburn v. Adams, 7 Met. 33.
3. It appears from the whole charge that the jury were properly
instructed on this point, so far as any claim of the plaintiff is
concerned. The motion merely shows that the plaintiff proved
"a continued use," not an exclusive one. The verdict then is
clearly right under any view of the law.
4. The charge was only pro forma,to get the opinion of the
jury on the character of the possession or use by the plaintiff.
The judgment should be for the defendants, however the jury
might find in regard to the possession. The highway was laid by
"Mystic River side." The charge proceeds upon the theory
that the public could lose the use of the locus in quo, so far as a
right of landing was concerned, but not for the ordinary purposesof a highway. But "where a street is laid out bordering on a
navigable water, it will be presumed that it was intended to be
dedicated both for a highway and a landing. The navigable
water is a highway; and where in contact with this the easement
of a street or highway is granted, the very location of the latter
shows that it was designed for the purpose of loading and
unloading freight, and landing passengers from the water. The
dedication to the water unites the two easements, each of which
is essential to the full enjoyment of the other:" Godfrey v. Cityq
of Alton, 12 Ill. 29. This case is approved by the Supreme
Court of Ohio: Holmes v. Railroad Co., 8 Am. Law Reg. 729.
The law is the same in England Peter v. Kendal, 6 Barn. &
Press. 703. Such being the law, it is submitted that, as long as
the public had a right to the use of the locus in quo as a highway,
they had also the right to use it for a landing, which is only passing
from one highway to the other. The plaintiff could acquire by
occupancy a right against any individual to the fee of the land,
but nothing against the public easement: Bead v. Leeds,. 19
Conn. 182.
PARK, J.-omplaint is made of the charge of the court to
the jury as to what it was necessary for the plaintiff, and the
parties under whom he claims title, to have done in order to
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extinguish the right of the public to the loeus in quo as a public
landing. The court instructed them "that in order to destroy
the public right they must have excluded the public and every
member of it." It is said that this language gave the jury to
understand that, during the running of the statute, the entry'
upon the premises of any member of the public, without permission
of the party in possession, would prevent the acquisition of a
prescriptive right in the plaintiff, whether the entry was made for
one purpose or another, and whether by stealth or otherwise. On
the other hand it is said that the court, in a subsequent part of
the charge, so qualified the language complained of, that the
whole is rendered unexceptionable.
It was claimed by the plaintiff, and the court adopted the
theory, that if the public had acquired a right to the locus for a
public landing, it was such a right as could be lost by prescription. If this be true it is quite evident that the charge was.
calculated to mislead the jury in determining whether it was
lost.
The first part of the charge is specific. It requires the exclusion of every member of the public from the premises. The
latter part is more general, and only renders it necessary that
the public should be substantially excluded. The first part is
more comprehensive than the last. The last does not purport to
have been given to qualify or explain the first; neither can it
receive that construction. They are independent representations
of the law concerning the same subject-matter; and inasmuch as
it cannot be known which part of the charge was received by the
jury as the law of the case, we are required to consider whether
either part gives the plaintiff cause to complain.
A title by prescription is based upon a grant, conclusively
presumed from an exclusive adverse possession of premises for a
period of fifteen consecutive years. The owner must be ousted
and the ouster must continue uninterruptedly for the prescribed
period of time. But when a party is once dispossessed it is not
every entry upon the premises without permission that would
disturb the adverse possession. He may tread upon his own soil
and still be as much out of possession of it there as elsewhere.
He must assert his claim to the land, perform some act that would
reinstate him in possession, before he can regain what he has lost.
It is evident, therefore, that an entry by stealth, under circum-
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stances that go to show that the party claimed no right to enter,
or an entry for other purposes than those connected with a right
to enter, would not be sufficient to break the continuity of exclusive possession in another.
It is quite probable that the court intended to be understood
by the language used in the first part of the charge, that every
member of the public must.be excluded from the possession of the
premises; but in common parlance the language would be understood differently. It would be taken to mean a physical exclusion
-an exclusion of mere casual entries upon the land, such as have
been alluded to; and it may be that the jury found for the
defendants solely on this ground.
But the defendants claim that judgment should be rendered in
their favor, however the jury might find in regard to the possession. They say that the facts of the case show that the premises
in question. form a part of a public highway, at its junction with
Mystic River, which is a navigable stream; and they claim that
where a highway upon land comes in contact with navigable
water, it is to be presumed that it was intended to have been
dedicated to the uses of a highway and -a public landing, and is
not therefore the subject of prescription.
Where a highway is laid out to navigable water and there terminates, there could be but little reason to doubt that it was
designed for the purpose 6f loading and unloading freight andlanding passengers from the water; and it would thereby become
a public landing as an incident to the public highway. But
suppose a highway in running from place to place incidentally
comes in contact with tide water, and runs along the beach for a
considerable distance, on account of facility in its construction or
other cause, would the whole length of the highway bordering
tide water, which might be many miles, ipso facto become a
public landing, irrespective of its neecl or fitness for such a purpose, so that the owner of the soil could not appropriate any part
of the shore to his own purposes although the fact was apparent
that the public would not be thereby incommoded ? If the law
is so, a different principle prevails along the line of contact of
these highways from that which governs each when separated.
It has been adjudged in many cases that the owner of the soil
may do such acts upon his own land, within the limits of a public
highway, as do not interfere with the public easement: Bartlett
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v. Everts, 8 Conn. 523; Burnham v. Hotehlkiss, 14 Id. 312;
Hopkins v. Crombie, 4 N. H. 520. And there is abundant
authority that the owner of land along the seashore may do in
like manner with his soil covered by the sea, if navigation is not
thereby incommoded: Angell on Tide Waters 159; East Haven
v. Hemingay, 7 Conn. 186; Frink v. Lawrence, 20 Id. 118;
Groton v. Hurlbut, 22 Id. 178. The principle running through
these cases, and many more that might be cited, is, that what
remains, after giving the public full enjoyment of their rights,
belongs to the owner of the soil.
And why should not the same principle govern in regard to a
public landing arising from the contact of these highways ? Can
any good reason be given in the case supposed, why the whole
length of the contact should perpetually remain ajlanding, where
the supposition is that a small part of it is capable of furnishing,
and in fact does furnish, all the conveniences for the full enjoyment of the public right? Cal anything more be asked for such
a right than full enjoyment? If so it- must be to'gratify the
caprice of same erratic navigator.
It certainly would be a novelty in judicial proceedings if a
prosecution could be sustained in such a case against the owner
of the soil, who had erected a wharf for his own purposes at a
place within the contact, but not required for any public use.
Upon what principle the court could declare such erection a
nuisance it is not easy to see.
It may be that public landings Trimdfacie exist along the line
of contact of all highways with tide water, as incident to such
highways, as all water where the tide ebbs and ilows is prirnd
facie navigable, notwithstanding its unfitness for navigation in
fact. But such general principles of law are brought within the
bounds of reason when undergoing judicial examination. Judge
ELLswumTI, in giving the opinion of the court in one of the cases
cited, says :-" It is time the public should understand that not
every ditch in which the tide ebbs and flows through the extensive
salt mi.arshes along the coast, and which serves to admit and drain
off the salt water from the marshes, can be considered a navigable
stream; nor is every small creek in which a fishing-skiff or
gmminPg-canoe can be made to float deemed navigable; but in
order to have this character it must be navigable for some general pur;pose useful to trade or business." And so it might be
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said in relation to landings of the class we are considering, that
notwithstanding their primd facie character, they must be needed
for public use, and must be restricted in extent to what is beneficial to the public.
The cases cited fully establish the doctrine that the owner of
land along the seashore may erect a wharf adjoining his land, and
enjoy it as his own, taking care not to interfere with navigation.
The enjoyment of a wharf necessarily requires a way, either
public or private, connected therewith. Suppose the former
exists. Now if the wharf no more interferes with the rights of
the public in relation to a landing than it does in regard to navigation, the case clearly comes within the principle of those cases,
and the party may enjoy his wharf.
The application of these principles to the case in hand is
readily seen and easily made. Although a public lauding at the
locus in quo may have existed primd facie, at the time the
plaintiff's ancestor erected the wharf, still, whether it was needed
for the purpose, so that the wharf could not become the property
of the plaintiff, would depend upon circumstances, and is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. The motion does not
state the facts necessary to enable us to decide this question, and
to judge, therefore, whether substantial justice has been done by
the verdict.
It was stated, however, by the counsel for the defendants, that
the highway was laid out in 1698, running "by Mystic River
side." If this was so it would seem that the highway runs along
the bank of the river for a considerable distance and only incidentally comes in contact with it; for the highway was laid out
at a time when it may fairly be inferred that there was not commerce enough on this stream to require the laying out of a highway for its enjoyment.
We cannot say, therefore, that substantial justice has been
done in the case, and a majority of the court are of the opinion
. that a new trial ought to be granted, and so we advise the
Superior Court.
In this opinion HINMAN, C. J., and DUTTON, J., concurred.
MCCUIDY, J., dissented. BUmER, J., having tried the case in
the court below, did not sit.

RAILROAD CO. v. CHENOWVITH.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
LACKAWANNA AND BLOOMSBURG R. R. CO. v. OHENOWITH.
The conductor and freight agent of a railroad passenger train, in violation of the'
rgulations of the company, consented to the attachment of a private freight car,
under charge of its owner and with an agreement not to be held answerable for any
injury resulting from the arrangement. An accident took place, not arising from
such act, by which the owner of the private car received personal injury.
Held, that the agreement was not so clearly beyond the powers of the company's
servants that their disobedience of the regulations would be a defence in an action
by the owner of the private car for damages.
The attachment of the car was too remote a cause of the injury tb be a defence
on the ground of contributory negligence.
The owner of the private car was a passenger.
Though in Pennsylvania a railroad company is not bound to fence its track to
keep off cattle, yet, as between it and its passengers, it takes the risk of injury to
them from that cause.
A passenger who leaves his proper'place in the car cannot recover for an injury
if it was in any degree the result of such act; but if his position was not in any
manner the cause of the injury it will not prevent his recovery, and on this point
the verdict is conclusive.

ERR1oR to Common Pleas of Luzerne county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
THomPsox, J.-1. The first assignment of error on this record
is to that portion of the charge of the learned judge in which he
held that the agents of the company, as well as the plaintiffs, acted
improperly in attaching freight cars to a. passenger train, yet that
the company could not repudiate the act so as to free'itself from
responsibility for negligence on the ground of want of power in
their agents.
We think the court committed no 'error in this. The arrangement was made with parties having full power over the subjectmatter; and to them the plaintiff was authorized to look, and was
required to look to no other. When, therefore, they consented
to hitch on his car to their passenger train, even at his urgent
solicitation-and we have not a particle of evidence that other
inducements were held out excepting freedom from responsibility
as a consequence of the attachment-we must presume that it was
done with a view to the compensation to be paid, on the one hand,
and the usual care to be exercised, on the other. The argument,
however, is, that the plaintiff was guilty of such a wrong in asking for and permitting his car to be attached, that whether the
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act contributed tb the disaster or not, he is to be treated as a
trespasser, and not entitled to any compensation for injuries not
wilfully done him. This we think is not the law, except in cases
where the will of the agent is controlled by improper influences,
or he is induced to do that which is manifestly beyond the scope
of his powers. That there was a regulation against running
freight cars with passenger trains may be admitted, although it
was not properly proved; yet that neither proved that it might
not be safely done, nor that, if the company undertook to do it,
they might lay aside the duty of care, and commit such cars to
the guardianship of chance. See Powell v. The B. 1. Co., 8
Casey 414. The great overstatement of the efforts made to
induce the defendant to take the plaintiff's cars, is the main
pillar upon which the argument against this portion of the charge
is constructed. Fairly stated, the facts were that the plaintiff
and another were desirous to get to Carlisle by a, certain day,
and urged to be taken on the train, by the company, as they had
missed connecting with The freight train. The conductor and
freight agent considered the matter, inquired into the capacity
of the cars to run with passenger cars, made up their minds, and
took them on their train, on a promise not to be held answerable
for any injury resulting from the arrangement. Was the plaintiff put outside the protection of the law, because he trusted to
their judgment to do an act within their power to do, and
especially when the act itself is not at all implicated in the disaster? The Railroad v. Norton, 11 Harris 470, gives no support
to such a doctrine. It was well decided on its own facts, and in
substance, presented the case of an authority given, or claimed
to have been given, to obstruct, or imminently endanger the
obstruction of, the track. No sane man could suppose the agent
of a railroad company had power to give any siich authority;
and hence a reliance upon it was an act of folly which the law
would not compensate It was palpable to the "outward sense"
that such obstruction was unlawful. Not so in this case. The
regulations which controlled among the operators of the company
were against it, but regulations for convenience may, and oftentimes are, suspended or modified, 'in obedience to certain exigencies by those in charge of the operations. When this is done,
an& no evil results, no harm is done. When the contrary is the
case, the only rule to apply is to give full effect to the conse-
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quences flowing from the act, and no more.

Here it is not pre-

tended that these freight cars, the plaintiff's and Hardics's, were
the cause of running over the cow in the road; and it cannot be
deemed that that was the immediate or -proximate cause of the
injury. In all cases like this, the maxim "proxima causa, vn
remota, spectatur" rules, and must rule here, unless the unlawfulness of the plaintiff's car, and himself, on the road is established.
We think this cannot be alleged by the company under the facts'
they have given in evidence, and we think there was no error in
this part of the charge.
.
It has been suggested that if the car had not been attached,
the plaintiff would not have been injured. Doubtless this is true,
and it is true of every injury. In all cases, if the party injured
had been absent, it is presumable he would not haive been injured
by the agency operating. The voluntary presence of the traveller, if not wrongful, is so much a matter of individual choice,
that its propriety is never an element to be inquired into in claiming or resisting damages for injxury. People have a right to
travel where they please, and will be compensated for injuries
if occasioned by the negligence of those engaged in transporting
them, if they have not contributed to the immediate disaster by
their own negligence, whatever might be said against the propriety of the journeying. It is no answer to the plaintiff's claim,
therefore, to argue that if he had not had his cars attached, and
been present, he would not have been injured. This was, manifestly, not the .proximate cause of the injury, and not to be considered unless it can be shown that he was a trespasser in being
on the train at the time. This he was not, for he was there by
permissioni, and under the control of parties competent to give
him authority to be there. His right to damages, therefore,
could only be tested by an inquiry into the 'question of what was
the immediate, not the remote cause of the injury. In noticing
another assignment of error, we will be brought directly to inquire
whether the case was properly dealt with on this ground, hnd will
not further discuss the point here. So far we discover no error
in the charge.
-2.Nor do we think the second assignment has been sustained.
The fair interpretation of the agreement of the plaintiff" is, that
if the agents of the defendant attached his car to the passenger
train, he was to assume the risk of that act; he did not assume
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the i isk of negligence on their part, nor could they contract for
exemption on account of it: Powell v. Penna. B. R. Co., 8
Casey 414. The position taken by the learned judge, and
noticed above, having placed the case before the jury on its true
grounds, in our opinion, namely, on the point of negligence, abd
not of authority in the agents to engage to transport the plaintiff
and his car, his remark that the plaintiff was entitled to recover,
if the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of the disaster,
was entirely proper. Why speculate about the supposed dangerous position assumed by the plaintiff, if no damage resulted from
it? Was he to become an outlaw for merely assuming what
proved to be no risk, and so forfeit his rights when he was blameless ? I know of no law to justify such a position.
3. In Lockhart et al. v. Lichltenthaler, 10 Wright 151, s. c.,
4 Am. Law Reg. 15, we held that a person in charge of a private
car, and acting on it as brakesman, was not a servant of the
company, so as to preclude his widow from recovering for the loss
of his life by the negligence of the servants of the road. Strictly,
a passenger he was not, nor was he a servant of the company,
neither earning wages from it nor bound to obey its orders,
excepting in regard to the property specially under
his charge.We held him entitled to the rights of.a passenger so far as injury
to him was concerned, and that case rules the present in tifs
particular ; and nothing now is needed on this point to show that
there was no error in this portion of the charge.
4. To the portion of the charge embraced in the fourth assignment of error, the objection seems to be that it referred the
question of negligence, alleged against the company, to the jury
without evidence. There was no error in the reference of the
question to the jury unless it be shown there was no sufficient
evidence of negligence to, go to the jury. But there was evidence on this point, unless the passenger was bound to take the
risk of cattle on the track, and the company not. Although
a railroad may not be bound to protect its road against trespassi'ig cattle, it is well settled that, as between it and its passengers,
it must take the risk of injury to them from such cause ; and it
is no answer to a claim for injury from such a cause, that the
defendant was not bound to fence, or that cattle were on their
track trespassing without their agency or knowledge. Their
being there, at the time of an accident, always raises a question
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of negligence or care, and whether negligence is imputable to
the company, or whether they have exercised due bare to guard
against obstruction from such cause, is always, and only, determinable by the jury.
In this case there was an omission to fence at the mouth, or
end, of a particular street. Near this was a watchman's station.
It was a pertinent inquiry, therefore, whether there was negligence in the company in not fencing at the point mentioned, or
whether the fault lay with the watchman, or either. If it lay
with one, or both, the plaintiff's case was made out, unless his
agency concurred in it. And of this the jury had been instructed
to inquire in a previous part of the charge. These facts most
certainly carried the case to the jury, and, in instructing them,
the court committed no error.
5. As we understand the learned judge, he charged that the
fact that the plaintiff, at the moment the accident' occurred,
was on the rear platform of the last passenger car, did not necessarily carry the case against him; and he gave his views of the
law on this point thus: "Yet if, by reason of his not being on
his own car, and handling, or ready to handle, his brake, which,
if done in due season, or for any other reason, you believe, as
argued here, would have lessened the chance of injury from
striking the cow by the cars; and as to any claim for personal
damage, or injury to his person, if, by the unauthorized change
of place, as contended for, he conduced to the danger or the
injury, which the jury think, under the evidence, he might have
escaped if he had been in his allotted situation, he must and
should be considered as guilty, himself, of carelessness and negligence conducive to the accident or injury."
The complaint that the charge lacks perspicuity, and is ambiguous, is, to some extent, just. But this the defendant should
have "provided against by asking for instructions better suited to
the case. If they chose to withdraw their points, they assumed
the very risk of which they now complain. This, perhaps, is
enough to say about the complaint of mere ambiguity. If the
judge had said nothing on the particular matter here involved,
in the absence of any request to charge in a particular way, we
would not reverse, as we have often said. By failing to pray
instructions, we must infer that the party thought it best to risk
what might be left unsaid rather than to call for special instrucVOL. XV.-7
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tions. If he is injured by omitting to do so, it is hia own error,
which we do iot sit to correct.
But if, from the language used by the judge, either on account
of ambiguity or want of perspicuity, there is good reason to
believe the jury have been misled as to the law, we ought to
reverse. Error from such a source is not less pernicious than
positive error from any other. The jury are entitled to reasonably clear and comprehensive instructions, wherever any ought
to be given; and where they fall so far short of this as to induce
a well-grounded belief of misapprehension on part of the jury,
this is generally sufficient to call for a reversal.
But the instructions embraced in this assignment of error,
though involved, were such, we think, as to have been understood
by the jury. We have no good reason to suppose they were not.
They assert that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was not
in his proper place, and leave the fact to the jury to say
whether this circumstance increased the danger of contact by
the train with the cow, by the omission of the plaintiff to handle
his brake, and whether his own injury was the result of his unauthorized change of position, or conduced to produce it, with a
sufficiently clear direction that if these facts were affirmatively
found, negligence was established against the plaintiff, and he
would not be entitled to recover. This we think the jury could
not fail to understand to he the meaning of the charge. If so,
was it right in principle ?
It is true, as argued for the plaintiff in error, that all the risk
of an unauthorized change of position by the plaintiff on the train
was assumed by him, and he was bound to abide it. If it conduced to produce the injury, although the defendant may have
been guilty of negligence at the same time, it would deprive him
of all right to compensation, the fault being, partly at least, his
own. But if it had no immediate connection whatever with the
agency producing the injury, it would be strange justice to impute to it the like effect as if it had. That must necessarily be
the conclusion in every case if the question is not for the jury. to
ascertain whether the acts of the plaintiff at the time have, or
have not, been such as to have conduced to the injury. That is
the rule, undoubtedly, in relation to passengers. carried by rail,
and was -what the learned judge referred to the jury in the
instruction complained of. If this was a proper inquiry for the
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jury, no error was committed in referring it to them. That this
was his meaning we readily discover from his language; and I
know of no rule by which we are bound to presume the jury did
not understand, and were misled by it. The result of their ver-.
dict, under the testimony, falls far short of establishing this.
The plaintiff in error avers, in his pleadings in this court, that
there is error here, and he is bound to prove it. We must have
more than suspicion of error upon which to base our action. If
language has a meaning comprehensible by us we ought, it being
untechnical, to presume it was comprehended in the same way by
the jury until the contrary be made to appear. That has not
been done in the argument on this point.
The question whether the injury to the plaintiff resulted in any
degree from his own acts or omissions, we think was plainly
enough referred 'to the jury, with a sufficiently decided expression that if it was, he was not entitled to recover damages from
the company; that if his negligence or misconduct contributed
to his own injury, he must blame himself. This was, in substance, the instruction, and there was nothing in it of which the
defendant can complain.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to confound the duty
resting on a passenger with the law of contract, wherein, if the
party do not comply, he is not entitled to the stipulated colnpensation. This is not -orrect, to the full extent. Strictly, a passenger is only entitled to enjoy the seat he pays for.. But, if he
be injured while passing about in the ear, or standing up, unless
such acts contribute to the injury, he will be entitled to be compensated if it resulted from the negligence of the carriers,
although he was out of his seat. If a passenger puts himself
ouat of place, and in a place of danger, and is injured as the
result, this is damnum absque iyjuria, and he cannot recover.
This results rather from the law of carriers than from a breach
of contract. If the contract were to control exclusively, then
any breach would defeat the injured party, without regard to the
effect of contributory acts. The duty to avoid risks, or unauthorized acts, I admit, grows out of a contract relation between
the carrier and passenger so far as to prevent a recovery on
account of them, but not so far as to prevent a recovery where
fault is with the carrier and the breach of the duty arising out
of the .contract has not contributed to the injury. If no harm
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ensues from the breach of the duty, no blame or loss ought to
follow. If the plaintiff did not contribute to his own injury by
being where he was, instead of where he had agreed to be, at
the moment of the accident, this would prove that the accident
was entirely independent of his agency. This was for the jury
to ascertain from the evidence, and so it was submitted to them,
and they have found the point in favor of the plaintiff, and
allowed damages. It may be they might, with better justice,
have come to a different conclusion. But if som, which we do not
assert, we cannot correct it. Only in case of clear error can
the court properly interfere with the verdict, the jury being constitutional triers, within their sphere, as truly as the cotirt.
These views do not-at least they are not intended to-impinge
upon the principle of the cases of Railroad Company v. Closkey, 11 Harris 520; Mcf~e6ully v. Clark oIhw,4 Wright
406; nor The Railroad Company v. Aspell, 11 Harris 149.
Indeed, we accord fully with them so far as their principles are
applicable to the circumstances of this case. The cause of the
injury here was in no way attributable to the plaintiff; but still
it was a question whether his acts or position at the moment of
the accident contributed to his own injury. That was a question
for the jury, and we see no error in the charge in submitting
it to them.
Judgment affirmed.

Superior Court of Cincinnati.
S. E. AMSINCK ET AL. v. WILLIAM HARRIS.
An order of attachment, issued by the clerk of.this court, on an insufficient
t
affidavit, is in effect "1coram non judice,' and therefore void, for the want of
jurisdiction.
Where such an order is dismissed, or vacated by the court, the rule applicable to
other judicial proceedings, where courts will not take jurisdiction, applies.
Therefore the dismissal of the order does not prevent a subsequent arrest for the
same cause of action: the maxim 'Ibis vexarP" does not apply. A proceeding
instituted where no jurisdiction exists, being void, it cannot be held to forbid
another proceeding, neither as a bar or in abatement.

Caldwell

Forrest,for plaintiffs.

aholson

Uhallen, for defendant.
O
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORER, J.-This is a motion reserved from Special Term on
the application of defendant, to dismiss an order of arrest, on the
ground that the defendant had been once in custody for the same
cause.
The facts appearing in the case are these:On the 81st day of Mlarch last, the plaintiff commenced his
action in the court against the defendant to recover 14,000,
which he claimed to be due to him for the price of merchandise
sold; on the same day a summons was served upon the defendant
to appear. An order for the arrest of the defendant was issued
at the same time by the clerk of the court, on an affidavit filed by
the plaintiff's agent, claiming under the Code the right to arrest
the defendant for various fraudulent acts. On this order the
defendant was taken into custody by the sheriff, and an application was subsequently made to one of our colleagues in Special
Term to vacate the order, on the ground that the affidavit upon
which the order issued did not conform to the requisitions of the
Code; the motion was overruled, and the question as to the sufficiency of the affidavit was taken to the General Term upon error,
where it was finally decided that the affidavit was insufficient to
authorize the arrest, and the ruling in Special Term being thereupon reversed, the order of arrest was vacated, and the defendant
discharged from custody.
After this the plaintiff filed another affidavit 'with the clerk,
whereupon a second order of arrest was issued and the. defendant
taken into custody by the sheriff, after which an application was
made by his counsel to a judge in Special Term to vacate the
last order of arrest, on the ground that he could not be arrested a
second time for the same cause, or in the same action; upon this
motion, after argument, the questions involved were reserved for
our opinion in General Term.
The question to be decided is, therefore, this,-can the last
order of arrest be sustained ?
The principle underlying the rule which is claimed to prohibit
a second arrest, nnemo debet bis vexari 2 ro eadem causa,"
applies equally to prevent the pending of two actions for the same
cause, at the same time, as well as the commencement of another
action after the first shall have been fully determined, and espe
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cially protects a- party when the plea of former conviction, or
former acquittal, is interposed in a criminal proceeding.
It has its foundation among the oldest maxims of the common
law, which has been incorporated, in its letter or spirit, into the
constitutions of all the states of the Union.
No one shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence, is
the germ from which, both in civil and criminal tribunals, from
time to time, have sprung up the different modifications and
applications of the ancient rule. To understand the true reason
of the rule, it is proper to examine and ascertain definitely the
meaning of the terms 11 twice in jeopardy."
It was formerly held in many of the states, that a party once
indicted for a crime could not be charged a second time for the
same offence, though there had been no trial upon the merits, as
where the jury were discharged for disagreement, or the indictment was quashed, or the judgment arrested; but it is now-held1 we
believe, in all the courts, that nothing short of an actual conviction or acquittal is a bar to a subsequent prosecution ; and the
same rule is observed in the trial of civil actions, without any
exception; no judgment-but a final one upon the merits can avail
to defeat a second action.
Hence pleas to the jurisdiction, in abatement, as well as all
dilatory pleas, as they determine nothing but the right of the
court to try, or the propriety of process, cannot be considered as
putting a party in jeopardy, within the reason of the principle to
which we have alluded.
Chief Justice KpnT, in le -Peoplev. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cases
301, and Judge SPENcER, in giving the opinion of the court in
the celebrated case of The .People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 200,
have exhausted the law on the subject.
Since these decisions were made very many cases have arisen,
both in England and in our own country, in which the courts
have explained more fully the application of the rule we have discussed, with its various modifications.
They are very carefully collected by Mr. Wharton in the
second volume of his excellent work on American Criminal Law,
under the title of "Once in Jeopaidy," §§ 572-591, and furnish
an interesting-topic for legal examination.
In order to sustain the plea of former acquittal, br conviction,
the court who tried the case must have had jurisdiction, else
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there has been no final determination of the matter litigated:
Bex v. Bowman, 6 Carrington & Payne 337; Com. v. Peters,
12 Metcalf 387 ; Marston v. Jenness, 11 N. H. 150 ; Me Cann's
Case, 14 Grattan 570.
If such is the law in relation to criminal offences, where life or'
limb may be in peril, we may readily trace the analogy of the
principle to civil remedies.
In England from a very early day the subject of arrests, and
discharge on common bail, has claimed very great attention where
the courts have been asked to grant or restrain process.
There has not been until the reign of the present Queen any
statutory provision defining the remedy, the right to arrest being
always regulated by the circumstances of the case, and the discretion of the judges, who have always exercised in the special
case their sound discretion. There never was, nor is there now,
a general rule that is merely arbitrary without exception or
limitation.
The cases referred to by counsel, when carefully examined,
fully establish the fact, that even in those exceptional cases,
where it would appear a second arrest was not consistent with
the usual practice, it must be evident there is a disposition to
harass and vex, rather than the honest pursuit of a legal right.
We find in the New York cases quoted in argument no wellestablished rule, but, rather, an hypothesis assumed, or proposed ;
not what we should respect as the exposition of a legal principle,
while a series of decisions by the courts of that state have
announced a rule, which, if it is sound, disposes without difficulty
of any embarrassment there which nisi prius adjudications, and
obiter dicta, may on first examination appear to have created.
Thus in Matter of Faulkner, 6 Hill 601, it was held by Judge
BRoNsoN that the affidavit for process always gives jurisdiction
to the court to grant it. In Broadheadv. 1M1cOonnell, 3 Barb.
175, it was expressly decided, that if the warrant of arrest is
issued without the proof required by statute, the warrant is void,
no jurisdiction having attached to the officer who issued it.
The precise question came before our Superior Court in Spice
" The authorities
. Son v. Steinruck-, 14 Ohio State Rep. 221.
cited," say the court, "and a just and proper regard for personal
liberty, constrain us to hold, that where a creditor seeks to arrest
his debtor under section 20 of the Justices' Code, he must comply
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with all the conditions thereby prescribed, and must, therefore,
state in his affidavit, among other things, I the facts claimed to
justify belief in the existence' of the fraudulent act and intenwion
set forth as a ground for the order. That until this is done, the
justice has no legal authority to issue such order, and that an
arrest under an order unsupported by such an affidavit, will be
held void in whatever form the question may arise."
We must conclude, then, that the first order of arrest issued in
this action was inoperative and void, conferring no right upon
the officer to arrest, and, of course, none upon the tribunal who
granted it. Being a void process, it was equivalent to no process, and though it may have been the instrument by which the
defendant was deprived for a time of his liberty, the right of the
plaintiff in the action was never adjudicated. The decision of
the court, therefore, in vacating the order, was simply a denial
of jurisdiction on their part, and could not avail to protect the
defendant in any subsequent litigation, or to deny to the plaintiff
another order of arrest.
Neither in the letter nor the spirit of the rule, "that no one
shall be twice vexed in the same action," do we think the defendant can demand its application on this motion.
He has been legally arrested but once ; the first arrest was
absolutely void.
The motion, therefore, to vacate the order before us must be
overruled.

Supreme Court of .Tl1inots.
REEDER ET AL. v. PURDY AND WIFE.
SAME v. PURDY..
The Illinois Statute of Forcible Entry and Detainer, by necessary construction,
forbids a forcible entry, even by the owner, upon the actual possession of another.
Such entry is, therefore, unlawfd, and is a trespass for which an acion of trespass
will lie.
Where an action of trespass is brought for a mere entry by a landlord upon the
possession of a tenant holding over, unaccompanied by any trespass upon either
the person or personal property of the plaiiitiff, and merely constructively forcible,
only nominal damages can be recovered ; the graramen of actions of this character
being tie trespass to the person and goods and chattels of the tenant.
The cases relating to the common-law right of an owner of land to enter forcibly
upon the unlawful possession of another, collected and discussed.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
LAWRENCE, J.-These two cases, although separately tried,
depend upon the same facts, and present similar questions, and it
will be more convenient to dispose of both in one opinion.
In October 1862, Reeder, claiming to be the owner of a house
occupied by Purdy and his wife, entered it, adcompanied by the
other appellants, for the purpose of taking possession. Purdy
was not at home, Mrs. Purdy refused to leave, whereupon Reeder
commenced putting the furniture out of doors. She resisted this,
and he seized and held her by the wrists, while Baker, one of the
co-defendants, continued to remove the furniture. This was
somewhat damaged, and some slight injury was done to the
wrists of 'Mrs. Purdy by the force applied in holding her. The
appellants finally abandoned their attempt to take possession and
withdrew.
Two actions of trespass have been brought-oni by Purdy
alone, and one by Purdy and wife jointly. The declaration in
the suit brought by Purdy contains three counts: the first being
for the assault upon his wife, the second for the injury done to
the~personal property, and the third for breaking his close and
carrying off his furniture. The declaration in the suit of Purdy
and wife contains two counts, both of which are for the assault
upon his wife. There were pleas of not guilty, and an agreement
that all defences might be made under them. A verdict for the
plaintiff of $450 in one case, and of $500 in the other, was
returned by the jury, and a judgment was rendered upon it, from
which the defendants appealed.
It is insisted by the appellants that Reeder, being the owner
of the premises, had a right to enter, and to use such force as
might be necessary to overcome any resistance, and that he cannot be made liable as a trespasser, although it 'is admitted he
might have been compelled to restore to Purdy, through an action
of forcible entry and detainer, the possession thus forcibly taken.
The court below instructed otherwise, and this ruling of the court
is assigned for error.
We should not consider the question One of much difficulty,
were it not for the contradictory decisions in regard to it, and we
must admit that the current of authorities, up to a comparativelyrecent period, is adverse to what we are firmly convinced must
be declared to be the law of this state. But the rule cannot be
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said to have been firmly or authoritatively settled even in Eng
land, for ERSKINE, J., observes in Newton v. Harla-nd, I Man.
& Gr. 644 (39 E. C. L. R. 952), that "it was remarkable a
question so likely to arise, should never have been brought
directly before any court in bane until that case." This was in
the year 1840, and all the cases prior to that time, in which it
was held that the owner in fee could enter with a strong hand,
without rendering himself liable to an action of trespass, seem to
have been merely at nisi yrius, like the oft-quoted case of
Taunton v. Costar, 7 T. R. 431. Still, this was the general
language of the books. But the point had never received such
an adjudication as to pass into established and incontrovertible
law, and a contrary rule was held by Lord LY-NDnUST in Hilary
v. Gay, 6 C. & P. 284 (25 E. C. L. R. 398). But in Newton
v. Harland, already referred to, the Court of Common Pleas
gave the question mature consideration, and finally held, after
two arguments, that a landlord who should enter and expel by
force a tenant holding over after expiration of his term, would
render himself liable to an action for damages. But the later
case of Meriton v..Combs, 67 E. C. L. R. 788, seems to recogfise
the opposite rule, and we must therefore regard a question which
one would expect to find among the most firmly settled in the
law, as still among the controverted points in Westminster Hall.
In our own country there is the same conflict of authorities.
In New York it has been uniformly held, that under a plea of
liberum tenementum the landlord, who has only used such force
as might be necessary to expel a tenant holding over, would be
protected against an action for damages: Hyatt v. Wood, 4 J.
R. 150; Ives v. Ives, 13 Id. 235. In Jackson v. Farmer, 9
Wend. 201, the court, while recognising the rule as law, characterizes it as "1harsh, and tending to the .public disturbauce and
individual conflict." Kent in his Commentaries states the principle in the same manner, but in the later editions of the work
reference is made by the learned editor, in a note to the case of
Newton v. Hfarland, above quoted, as laying down "the most
sound and salutary doctrine." In Tribble v. Frame, 7 J. J.
Marsh. 598, the court hold that, -notwithstanding the Kentucky
statute of forcible entry and detainer, the owner of the fee,
having a right of entry, may use such force as may be necessary
to overcome resistance, and protect himself against an action of
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trespass, under a plea of liberuik tenementum.

On the other
hand, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that, although
trespass quare clausum may not lie, yet in an action of trespass
for assault and battery, the landlord must respond in damages, if
he has used force to dispossess a tenant holding over. The court'
say "he may make use of force to defend his lawful possession,
but being dispossessed, he has no right to recover possession by
force, and by a breach of the peace :" Sampson v. Henry, 1i
Pick. 379. See, also, Ellis v. Page, 1 Id. 43; Sampson v.
Heitry, 13 Id. 36; Meade v. Stone, 7 Met. 147, and lloore v.
Boyd, 24 Maine 242. But by far the most able and exhaustive
discussion this question has received, was in the case of Dusti.,
v. Cowdry, 23 Vt. 635, in which Mr. Justice REDFIELD, delivering the opinion of the court, shows by a train of reasoning which
compels conviction, that, in cases of this character, the action of
trespass will lie. And he also says "whether the action should
be trespass quare clausum, or assault and battery, is immaterial,
as under this declaration, if the defendant had pleaded soil and
freehold, as some of the cases hold, the plaintiff might have new
assigned the trespass to the person of the plaintiff, and a jury,
under proper instructions, would have given much the same
damages, and upon the same evidence, in whatever form the
declaration is drawn."
In this conflict of authorities, we must adopt that rule which,
in our judgment, rests upon the sounder reason. We cannot
hesitate, and were it not for the adverse decisions of courts which
all lawyers regard with profound respect, we should not deem the
question obscured by a reasonable doubt. The reasoning upon
which we rest our conclusion lies in the briefest compass, and is
hardly more than a simple syllogism. The Statute of Forcible
Entry and Detainer, not in terms, but by necessary construction,
forbids a forcible entry, even by the owner, upon the actual
possession of another. Such entry is therefore unlawful. If
unlawful, it is a trespass, and an action for the trespass must
necessarily lie. It is urged that the only remedy is that given
by the statute-an action for the recovery of the possession.
lBut the law could not expel him who has entered, if his entry
was a lawful entry, and if not lawful, all the consequences of an
unlawful act must attach to it, one of which is a .liability for
whatever damages have been done to him whose posscssion has
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been forcibly invaded. The law is not so far beneath the dignity
of a scientific and harmonious system, that its tribunals must hold
in one form of action, a particular act to be so illegal that immediate restitution must be made at the costs of the transgressor,
and in another form of action, that the same act was perfectly
legal, and only the exercise of an acknowledged right.
It is urged that the owner of real estate has a right to enter
upon and enjoy his own property. Undoubtedly, if he can do so
without a forcible disturbance of the possession of another; but
the peace and good order of society require that he shall not be
permitted to enter against the will of the occupant, and hence
the common-law right to use all necessary force has been taken
away. He may be wrongfully kept out of possession, but he cannot be permitted to take the law into his own hands and redress
his own wrongs. The remedy must be sought through the peaceful agencies which a civilized community provides for all its
members. A contrary rule befits only that condition of society
in which the principle is recognised that
"He may take who hath the power,
And he may keep who can."

If the right to use force be once admitted, it must necessarily
follow, as a logical sequence, that so much may be used as shall
be necessary to overcome resistance, even to the taking of human
life.
The wisdom of confining men to peaceful remedies for the
recovery of a lost possession is well expressed by Blackstone,
Book 4, p. 148: " An eighth offence," he says, " against the
public peace is that of a forcible entry and ddtainer, which is
committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands and
tenements with menaces, force, and arms, and without the authoiity of law. This was formerly allowable to every person.
disseised or turned out of possession, unless his entry was taken
away or barred by his own neglect, or other circumstances, which
were explained more at length in a former book. But this being
found very prejudicial to the public peace, it was- thought necessary, by several statutes, to restrain all persons from the use of
such violent methods, even of dloing themselves justice; and
much more if they have no justice in their claim. So that the
entry now allowed by law is a peaceable one; that forbidden -is
such as is carried on with force, violence, and unusual weapons."

REEDER ET AL. r. PU-RDY AND WIFE.

In this state it has been constantly held that any entry is forcible,
within the meaning of this law, that is made without the consent
of the occupant.
We state, then, after a full examination of this subject, that, in
our opinion, the statutes of forcible entry and detainer should be'
construed as taking away the previous common-law right of forcible entry by the owner, and that such entry must be therefore
held illegal in all forms of action.
There are, however, some minor points upon which both of
these judgments must be reversed. In the suit brought by the
husband alone the court refused to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff could not recover for any damages to the real estate.
This instruction should have been given. Although the occupant
may maintain trespass against the owner for a forcible entry, yet
he can only recover such damages as have directly accrued to
him from the- invasion of his possession, or from injuries done to
his person or property, and such exemplary damages as the jury
may think proper to give. But a person having no title to the
premises clearly cannot recover damages for any injury done to
them by him who has title, except so far as damages directly
result to him through the forcible disturbance of his possession.
It would be a startling doctrine to hold that the wrongful occupier of land could make the owner thereof respond to him in
damages for timber that the owner might cut upon the premises.
This point was decided by this court in Hoots v. Graliam, 23
Ills. 82, to the decision in which case we fully adhere,
In the case brought by Purdy, the court, after telling the jury
they could give exemplary damages; gave the following instruction
for the plaintiff: "In estimating the amount of exemplary damages, if they find any, the jury have a right to take into consideration the unla~ful purpose for which defendants were together.
if any is proven; the force and violence with which they attempted
to carry out that purpose; the wantonness of the attack upon the
premises, family, and property of the plaintiff, if the proof show
any such; and the wilfulness of the defendants in doing the acts,
ifthe evidence show any such."
The suit brought by Purdy and wife had been already tried,
and in that suit the jury had been instructed they might give
exemplary damages, and they had undoubtedly given them. The
record of that suit was in evidence on the trial of the second
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suit.. The court refused the instructions asked by the defendant,
and properly, in the form they were drawn, except as to the one
already considered. Neither is there anything in itself wrong in
the foregoing instruction, and yet it is of such a character that
the court, in order to secure a fair consideration of the case by
the jury, and having refused all the instructions drawn by-the
defendant, should, of its own motion, have modified the somewhat
argumentative effect of this one, by telling the jury that they
were also, in estimating the exemplary damages, to consider the
fact that the jury in the other suit had been authorized to give
exemplary damages, and to take into consideration on that question the amount of the verdict in the other case. We must hold
that, in strict law, exemplary damages are recoverable in both
cases, because the suits are brought in different rights. In the
suit by Purdy and wife, if Purdy fail&to collect the judgment in
his lifetime, on his death it would go to the wife surviving him,
and not to his personal representatives. But, apart from that
contingency, the fruits of both judgments go into his pocket. ,It
would therefore be highly proper that the jury, in considering
the question of damages, should have taken into consideration, not only the circumstances of aggravation enumerated in
the instruction, but also the fact that these same circumstances,
and the same transaction, had been submitted to another jury in
a suit prosecuted in reality for the benefit of the same plaintiff,
and, so far as related to the single question of the amount of vindictive damages, the amount of the former verdict would have
been a proper subject of regard.
The jury were also told in the third instruction for the plaintiff
at the suit of Purdy, that the fact that the defendant was the
owner, and entitled to the possession of the premises occupied
by plaintiff, could not be regarded by the jury in mitigation of
any actual damages caused to the plaintiff by the assault and
force. This is undoubtedly true, so far as actual damage was
concerned, but it would not be true in regard to exemplary damages, unless we are prepared to say that it is as inexcusable for a
person to attempt to recover his own property by force, as it
would be to rob another of property to which the assailant has
no claim. This would not be contended; and while therefore the
third instruction was strict law, yet, in connection with the other
instructions, in regard to exemplary damages, and unexplained
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by anything in behalf of the defendant, we think the jury would
be likely to be misled. This is more especially true in regard
to the suit of Purdy and wife ; for, in the third instruction for the
plaintiff in that suit, the jury are told the same thing as to the
damages, but the word actual is left out. These instructions
should have been so modified that the jury would clearly understand, on the question of vindictive damages, they would have a
right to regard the fact that the plaintiff was the owner, and
entitled to the possession of the property-a fact proven in the
case.
This last objection applies equally to the instructions in both
cases. The others, above considered, apply only to the suit of
Purdy. There is, however, another fatal objection to the judgment
in favor of Purdy and wife. Both counts in that declaration are
for injuries done to the person of the wife. A suit could not
have been maintained in their joint names for injuries done tp
the property of Purdy. Yet the court, against the objections
of defendants, allowed the plaintiff to give in evidence the injury
done to the furniture. This was wholly inadmissible, except
so far as might be necessary to explain the assault on the person
of the wife; and in a case of this character, notwithstanding the
instructions given for the defendants, this evidence would have a
strong tendency to improperly prejudice them in the minds of
the jury.
In order to prevent misapprehension, we would say, in conclusion, that for a, mere entry by the landlord upon the" possession
of a tenant holding over, unaccompanied by any trespass upon
either the person or personal property of the plaintiff, and merely
constructively forcible, only nominal damages could be recovered.
The gravamen of actions of this character is the trespass to the
person and goods and chattels of the tenant. If, for example,
a tenant of a house should remove his family and furniture at the
end of the term, but refuse, without reason, to surrender the key
to his landlord, and still claim the possession, the landlord might
nevertheless force the door of his vacant house without incurring
a liability to more than nominal damages. He would be liable
to an action of forcible entry and detainer, and to an action of
trespass in which nominal damages would be recovered, because
the entry would be unlawful, but to nothing more. But for an
entry while the house is still occupied by the family and furniture

